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The idea of the brilliant and elegant philosopher judge has a long and romanticized history. 
From Sir Edward Coke, William Blackstone and Joseph Story to Oliver Wendell Holmes, 
Louis Brandeis and Lord Bingham, the common law is replete with this vision of judging. In 
this vision, judges sometimes seem to be law makers as much as faithful it interpreters. In 
many ways Antonin Scalia fought against this traditional vision of the philosopher judge. He 
disliked activist judges who   imposed their idea of wisdom on elected legislatures; in fact, he 
trumpeted his jurisprudence for its fidelity to law and deference to the popular will. But even 
though Scalia fought against the romantic vision of philosopher judge, he himself became a 
living symbol of a judicial philosophy, a symbol so powerful that sometimes it was difficult 
to disentangle the judge from his jurisprudence. His status as a symbol and how he achieved 
his status, was much different from the route of the judges mentioned above. This paper 
attempts to explain how Scalia became what we call a judicial “sacred symbol”.  
I. SCALIA’S DEATH 
Antonin Scalia died in the early morning hours of February 13, 2016. Reactions to his death 
were resoundingly, even if begrudgingly, praiseworthy; either way you cut it, Scalia was a 
giant in terms of his impact on American law. Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, one of Scalia’s 
closest friends on the Court—but also an ideological sparring partner—said, “‘We are 
different, we are one’, different in our interpretation of written texts, one in our reverence for 
the Constitution and the institution we serve”.1 Even those outside traditional legal and 
political circles took note of Scalia’s passing and commented on his larger than life status.. 
Stephen Colbert, a late-night comedian who on many occasions had lambasted Scalia’s views 
on the law, recounted an unexpectedly warm moment with the Justice, and praised him for 
his sense of humour,2 a characteristic that we also explore below. Colleagues, friends, 
journalists, acquaintances, and others, acknowledged him as a quintessential, if controversial, 
American judge.  
A range of memorials and acknowledgements followed Scalia’s death. The George Mason 
University School of Law announced it would rename itself: The Antonin Scalia Law School 
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at George Mason University.3 Law reviews published tributes. For example, the Minnesota 
Law Review published an online symposium providing a number of insightful articles about 
Scalia,4 and the Harvard Law Review dedicated an issue to the late Justice, complete with 
commentary from Chief Justice John Roberts, Justice Elena Kagan, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg, Cass Sunstein, John Manning, Martha Minow and Rachel Barcow.5 One prominent 
legal scholar who has written extensively about judges’s legacies noted that Scalia “has a 
definite shot at greatness”.6 
In fact a marked difference highlighted reactions to Scalia’s death and the death of former 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist one decade earlier, on December 5, 2005. Beyond the shock 
of an untimely death—it was known for some time that Rehnquist was battling cancer—
Scalia’s death left not only a vacancy on the Supreme Court, but was also blow to 
conservative legal thought. While Rehnquist had served on the Court longer than Scalia, it 
was Scalia who had pushed for the Court to move its jurisprudence in a different direction.7 
Rehnquist may have moved the Court—and therefore America—to the right simply by his 
presence, but Scalia, arguably, moved an entire body of legal thought to the right, and made it 
so that even those who did not agree with his interpretative methods had to come to terms 
with them. 8  But as Justice Kagan has recently said, it was not just his interpretive 
methodologies that were significant. As she put it, the late justice “did nothing less than 
transform our legal culture”.9 Indeed, as we will discuss below, Scalia significantly pushed 
the boundaries judicial behaviour—both on and off the bench—within the United States and 
potentially abroad. Indeed, he was not merely a judge, but a marketer and perhaps even a 
showman…and a formidable one at that.  
 
A. A CRISIS OF SCALIAN PROPORTIONS 
Although the passing of any justice during a presidential election year would generate 
controversy and concern, the passing of such a provocative and widely celebrated justice 
certainly enhanced the chaos, creating a quasi-constitutional crisis.  In one incident, the Chair 
of the Senate judiciary committee (Sen. Chuck Grassley (R., IA)), made an unprecedented 
speech on the Senate floor about the politicisation of the Supreme Court, accentuating that 
such politicisation—or, at least, the appearance of it. Grassley claimed that this was not the 
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result of the Senate’s confirmation processes,10 but because of the Court’s own decisions. 
Senator Grassley even boldly instructed Chief Justice John Roberts, “physician, heal thyself”, 
as regards the Court’s overly political decisions.11 While Senator Grassley’s comments 
surprised and even angered some, recent polls have demonstrated that the American public 
has less confidence in the Supreme Court than at any point in history; a July 2016 Gallup poll 
found that 52% of Americans disapproved of the way the Supreme Court was handling its 
job.12  
Scalia’s death has also left a four-four ideological split among the Court’s remaining 
justices. In some nations this would not be a major issue, but for one in which the Supreme 
Court decides the “nation’s most pressing issues”,13 it is indeed a problem. On March 16, 
2016, President Obama nominated judge Merrick Garland of the United States Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, to replace Scalia. The Senate refused to move 
forward on his nomination, and Judge Garland endured the longest-delay of any Supreme 
Court nominee in history, passing the likes of Robert Bork and Clarence Thomas, as he 
awaiting a hearing (that would never come) on his nomination.14  
There are signs that, even after the recent Presidential election in the United States, Senate 
approval of Supreme Court nominations could still be a major constitutional issue. Before the 
election, some Republicans discussed the possibility, that should Hilary Clinton become 
President, that the Senate would of refuse to confirm any of her.15 And now that Donald 
Trump has won the presidency, Democrats may employ various delaying strategies against 
anyone he nominates. As Graham notes, the proposed Republican plan would have been the 
opposite of FDR’s infamous court-packing plan, slowly diminishing the number of justices 
on the Court. To justify this effort, some commentators claimed that the Constitution allows 
for non-confirmation of any Presidential nominees to the Court.16 While it is possible that any 
death on the “conservative” side of the Court could have brought this situation about, the fact 
that it was Scalia’s seat which came open amplified the stakes in replacing him.   
 
B. THE PROGRESSION OF THIS ARTICLE 
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To try to make sense of the meaning of, and reactions to, Scalia’s death, we investigate how 
Scalia became a “sacred symbol”.17 First we examine the changing role of the American 
judiciary, and how Scalia became the perhaps the face of it. While American judges have a 
long history of engaging in Academic scholarship,18 only relatively recently have they 
become more publicly engaged, giving lectures and appearing on television, in addition to 
appearing at promotional events for books they author. Are such changes here to stay; and if 
so, what does this mean for the cultural life of the law?  
We follow this by addressing Scalia’s rise as the leader of conservative jurisprudence. 
Tracking Scalia’s trajectory, including his connections to the 1980s conservative movement 
and other prominent conservative legal thinkers, like Robert Bork, is essential to 
understanding his “sacred symbol” status. Here the issue of judicial “mandates” arises. 
Although it may be odd to think in such terms, many American judges are characterised 
throughout their careers by reference to who nominated them and when they were nominated. 
Indeed, nomination by a particular president often impacts how the media or general public 
perceives justices. We discuss the significance of the perception that Supreme Court judges 
have “mandates”.   
Next, we consider Justice Scalia’s writing. Scalia was notorious for the strident tone and 
rhetorical ingenuity of his opinions and often mentioned that this was used to engage his 
readers. While questions arise concerning the audience for Supreme Court opinions, it is not 
surprising that Scalia had his own thoughts on the matter: he repeatedly stated throughout the 
years that one of the primary audiences for judgments was law students. Connected to 
Scalia’s writing, we scrutinise the way he used humour. He often found moments for 
laughter, and this was especially so on the bench—either in oral argument or through his 
sarcastic opinions.  
In the following section we examine how Justice Scalia used and marketed his 
jurisprudential theories. His prolific writing and active promotion of “originalist” and 
“textualist” theories raises further questions about judges and their connection to popular 
culture. Finally, we return to the idea of Scalia as a “sacred symbol” and consider how this 
idea may impact the cultural life of the law. Although there is a large literature on judicial 
reputation and the behaviour of judges,19 we take a different—perhaps complementary—
approach, examining Justice Scalia’s cultural significance and impact, and using him as a 
lens to help us better understand the cultural relevance, and consequence, of judging in the 
21st century.  
 
II. THE CHANGING (PUBLIC) ROLE OF THE JUDICIARY 
In some jurisdictions supreme or constitutional court justices seem to be contemporary deities, 
balancing the scales of justice through reasoned (and sometimes impassioned) judgments; in 
other jurisdictions, such judges are merely…well, judges. This distinction sometimes hinges 
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on constitutional structures and types of judicial review available in particular jurisdictions, 
but as other researchers have acknowledged, separating strong-forms and weak-forms of 
review is not as easy as it seems.20 Yet Justice Scalia’s judicial career highlighted a number 
of important issues concerning the contemporary role and status of the judiciary.  
Without a doubt, states throughout the world have recently gone through a judicial 
renaissance. 21  Ginsburg and Virsteeg found that the ability of courts to “supervise 
implementation of the constitution and to set aside legislation for constitutional 
incompatibility” increased from 38% in 1951 to 83% in 2011.22 Jurisdictions are increasingly 
likely to put contentious problems into the hands of judges. Thus we can begin with an 
uncontroversial statement: that supreme and constitutional courts have prominent structural 
and cultural positions in their respective jurisdictions. This position primarily revolves around 
interpreting and applying the law in order to resolve disputes. Constitutional courts are 
prominent symbols of the operation of the law or legal process within a given state, and 
judges are widely considered to be the most prominent actors within such processes. This is 
true whether or not a state’s judiciary has a good or bad reputation, or whether judges engage 
in strong-form or weak form review.  
When Alexander Hamilton characterised the American judiciary as the “least dangerous 
branch”23 he certainly did not mean that it would be unpopular or culturally irrelevant. In 
fact, it may be the case that “least dangerous” correlates with “highest approval” or most 
popular branch of government. Throughout modern history the U.S. Supreme Court has 
enjoyed relatively high popularity, 24  at least compared to Congress. 25  The strategic 
positioning of the Court has also changed throughout its history. Unlike its previous location 
in the Old Senate Chamber (in addition to other places), the Court now sits in a prominent 
position in the nation’s capitol. Bordered by the Library of Congress to the south, the Capitol 
to the west, and Constitution Avenue to the north, the building resides in the city’s political 
epicentre. Above the tall roman pillars to the building’s entrance is inscribed the phrase: 
“Equal Justice Under Law”. Whether or not this is what the Court actually provides is 
irrelevant: the takeaway is that, in terms of American justice, the Supreme Court is the most 
prominent, as well as last, port of call for those seeking a judicial remedy.  
Adding to this prominence is the fact that in the United States judges have become more 
significant as public figures who participate in a wide range of extra-judicial activity, such as 
delivering speeches, agreeing to interviews, appearing on talk shows, and of course writing 
scholarly books and articles. While Supreme Court justices—and the American judiciary as a 
whole—have long been involved in such extra-judicial activities, today they are much more 
common. But whether or not this increase in extra-judicial activity carries positive 
implications for the judiciary remains to be seen. As Jeffrey Shaman has stated, the “line 
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between permissible and impermissible extra-judicial activity is not an easy one to walk, and 
is redrawn from time to time”.26 Justice Scalia was certainly one to push those boundaries.  
 
III. SCALIA’S RISE TO “SACRED SYMBOL” 
Some may look at Scalia’s tenure on the Court and find it relatively easy to classify him as a 
“sacred symbol”; others may scoff at the idea of thinking of him in that way.  Sceptics would 
point to the fact that, although Scalia served on the Court for close to thirty years, he was not 
even in the top ten of the Supreme Court’s longest-serving justices.27 In fact William 
Rehnquist served for 33 years, and had more time to impact the Court’s jurisprudence.  
Additionally, outside of Heller,28 Scalia did not author many well-known opinions on major 
constitutional issues. He was mostly known for, and appeared to thrive on, his predilection 
for fiery dissents. Finally, although Scalia was certainly respected in the legal community, he 
did not have a squeaky clean personal reputation. Long known for being smug,29 brash,30 
aggressive,31 dogmatic,32 and overly sarcastic,33 Scalia used these qualities to advance his 
agenda and fend off his rivals.  
Nonetheless, many other things turned Scalia into a “sacred symbol”, and these are 
explored below.  
 
A. JUDGING FOR THE RIGHT: FULFILLING (OR NOT FULFILLING) JUDICIAL 
“MANDATES” 
Like Justices John Roberts, Elena Kagan, Sonia Sotomayor, Clarence Thomas, Steven Breyer 
and Samuel Alito, and a host of other SCOTUS justices before them, Scalia had extensive 
experience in federal (or state) government before ascending to the bench, and thus was 
familiar with the politics of law and the law of politics. Scalia served in government at a time 
when ideas about originalism were on the move both intellectually and practically, and like 
any great opportunist—and without a doubt, Scalia was one—Scalia took advantage of it. 
When Bork,34 Rehnquist35 and Berger36 were publishing their influential work on originalism, 
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Edwin Meese had control of the Reagan Justice Department.37 After a stint in the powerful 
Office of Legal Counsel (1974-1977), Scalia spent a few years working in academia at the 
University of Virginia and then at the University of Chicago, honing his views on law and 
especially on his interpretative theories. During this time he served as the founding faculty 
adviser of the Federalist Society, a group which advocates judicial restraint, but that also 
champions conservative causes.38 Scalia forged a conservative ideology that would come to 
define his jurisprudence, and which ultimately led to two judicial appointments under 
Reagan: one to the US Court of Appeals (DC Circuit) in 1982, and the other to the Supreme 
Court in 1986. Scalia’s ascension to the Court, like so many other SCOTUS justices, was a 
reward for political service. But would Scalia fulfil his judicial “mandate” as a Reagan 
nominee, or would he feel unshackled by his lifetime appointment to the nation’s highest 
court?  
The idea of judicial mandates arises from the fact that in the US federal judicial 
appointment stems from a political process: nominations operate on a fairly open process that 
involves selection by the President and confirmation from the Senate, two inherently political 
branches. Until recently that process worked relatively smoothly,39 with the longest hearing 
or confirmation of a Supreme Court nominee taking 125 days.40 Because of this overtly 
political process, citizens may associate justices with the President who nominated them. In 
fact, the media consistently link justices with the President nominated them.41 If citizens are 
constantly encountering information about which president appointed which justices, then of 
course there will be an implicit—if not entirely explicit—connection from politics to law.  
The expectations arising from judicial mandates fuelled controversy about Chief Justice 
John Roberts’ role in in protecting the Affordable Care Act (“Obamacare”) from legal 
challenge in 201242 and 2015.43 Many prominent Republicans spoke out against the Chief 
Justice, and, as noted above, Senator Chuck Grassley (R., IA) recently directed some pointed 
words towards Justice Roberts and the politicisation of the Supreme Court.44 But Roberts is 
certainly not the only example of a US Supreme Court justice accused of betraying his 
“mandate”. Justice Harry Blackmun (1970-1994), once beloved by conservatives, was, by the 
end of his tenure, loathed by the right. Nominated by Richard Nixon, Justice Blackmun 
earned the enduring ire of conservatives for his decision in Roe v. Wade.45 He went on to defy 
his closest friend on the Court, Chief Justice Warren Burger (1969-1986), and in his later 
years often voted with the court’s liberal block. Such “unfulfilled” judicial mandates have not 
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been uncommon among SCOTUS justices (see Earl Warren, William Brennan, John Paul 
Stevens and David Souter, among others).  
The idea of judicial mandates certainly has political and legal implications that may 
impact judicial independence, a notion that is considered an essential and long-standing 
element of the rule of law. If judges feel under any obligation to the president who nominated 
them, it may compromise their ability to impartially adjudicate.  
As regards Scalia, there is no doubt that he fulfilled and even surpassed his mandate. 
Scalia used his conservative background, perhaps even his religion,46 to put himself forward 
as the “godfather”47 of judicial conservativism. Whether or not he stuck firmly to his 
principles is up for debate,48 but the widespread perception of Scalia as the vanguard of 
conservative jurisprudence remains one of his lasting legacies, and certainly underlined his 
status as a “sacred symbol”.  
 
B. SCALIA’S INTANGIBLES: A PERSONALITY ON THE COURT 
 
1. HIS WRITING 
Long known as a leading “formalist”,49 Scalia certainly did not act like a formalist when it 
came to his writing style or behaviour during oral argument. His writing on the Court often 
drew a combination of praise, ire and disbelief. How could a Supreme Court justice get away 
with using “jiggery-pockery”, referencing “broccoli” mandates, or referring to colleagues 
reasoning as “pure applesauce”? On numerous occasions Scalia noted that he wrote his 
judgments, and especially his dissents, for law students.50 Given the status and prominence of 
the US Supreme Court—not only from a national perspective but also internationally—this is 
a curious statement. Was the notion of “writing for law students” merely an excuse to pen his 
decisions in a more biting or engaging tone?  
 Law students cannot yet practice law, but they do have to read and discuss Supreme Court 
opinions. Scalia’s believed that if students must read these opinions, then the decisions 
should be entertaining and engaging. But if Justice Scalia aimed at legal amateurs, why 
would he not aim his opinions at the wider citizenry? There is certainly nothing wrong with 
justices aiming their opinions at a wide audience. After all, using non-technical or “plain 
language” is something that other judges have championed: Sonia Sotomayor has 
incorporated plain language tactics, and has noted that the technical language of the law may 
obscure the relevance of a decision.51  
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But, is not the primary audience for any jurisdiction’s supreme or constitutional court the 
wider citizenry? From a legal perspective the only sub-group supreme court judgments matter 
to are the parties involved in the litigation. But the higher the court, the more frequently the 
decisions will be used by lower courts when adjudicating similar disputes. Thus, even from a 
purely legal perspective there are multiple audiences for such judgments.  
A political scientist may think that Supreme Court judgments are relevant for a number of 
reasons: for example, such decisions may demonstrate a political check on executive or 
legislative actions, thus justifying the separation of powers; or a decision may have direct 
relevance to a prominent political issue, thus presenting an opportunity for political 
mobilisation. This expands the potential audiences for judges and their decision but does not 
necessarily go far enough.  
A cultural viewpoint, however, would provide a more complete perspective. Such a 
perspective recognises that judicial opinions are used not just by legal and political actors, but 
by a plethora of individuals, from journalists, academics, businesses, and police forces to 
citizens and even by others in foreign jurisdictions. Some opinions may even become cultural 
touchstones, assuming iconic status for citizens (i.e., Brown or Roe). Thus, to distinguish 
Supreme Court judgments as meant for a specific group discounts their large cultural 
relevance. Perhaps Scalia’s biting sarcasm or linguistic provocations were a veiled 
recognition of this cultural perspective. Perhaps he was not intending to “trash” his 
colleagues or de-legitimise the court, so much as he was attempting to say (in his own unique 
style, of course): “hey, look at what we’re doing here…this is important to everyone”.  
2. HIS HUMOUR 
Justice Scalia famously repeated the line, “I am an originalist. I am a textualist. I am not a 
nut”;52 and it was Scalia who first called himself a “faint-hearted originalist”.53 He was 
recognised by many—even by those outside of legal circles—for his caustic wit and his 
predilection for humour.54 Oftentimes during oral argument he would (at least attempt to) 
liven things up with a sarcastic comment or a joke. Scalia was by far the funniest justice on 
the Court for the past decade (followed by Stephen Breyer).55 The number of laughs he 
received in oral argument far outpaced any other justice (although there is not a rate for 
“attempts at humour” versus actual laughs). Nonetheless, Scalia used his humour to establish 
himself as an interesting and memorable judge.  
It is difficult to ascertain just how or why Scalia felt the need to frequently make light of 
the work of the Court or himself or of a particular situation. Perhaps it was humour for 
humours sake, and that is fair enough, especially in a world that often takes things far too 
seriously.56 But there are other outcomes stemming from Justice Scalia’s humour and 
engaging writing style. The humour Scalia used on and off the bench and in opinions called 
attention to him. It made him more than just another dry or overly-technical Supreme Court 
justice. Thus, Scalia opened himself up on the bench, displaying personality traits in ways 
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that other justices remain hesitant to do. This is helpful to understanding Scalia’s status as 
“sacred symbol”. The idea that a judge is not just a judge, but a living, breathing and as it 
sometimes turns out, entertaining person, is something that the law—rightly or wrongly—
attempts to hide through overarching principles and codes of behaviour. It was not as if Scalia 
disrespected those principles—although some certainly claim that he did—but that he 
challenged the traditional notions of judging.  
 
C. LEADING INTERPRETATIVE THEORIST AND MARKETER 
Scalia’s influence on American law—and perhaps more importantly, how constitutional cases 
are interpreted throughout the state and federal judiciary—was immense. He championed 57 
originalist and textualist interpretative theories,58 and was not bashful when confronting 
others who operated on different interpretations.59  
Many US judges have been recognised as leading interpretative theorists, but not all of 
them sat on the Supreme Court. Jerome Frank, a leader in the legal realist movement, sat on 
the US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (1941-1957). His first book, Law and the 
Modern Mind,60 written after he had undergone six months of psychotherapy, was extremely 
influential among judges and scholars. Transaction Publishing has even recently re-published 
the book, with an introduction from celebrated constitutional scholar Brian H. Bix.61 Another 
more recent example is Richard Posner, who has served on the US Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit from 1981. He is a leading proponent of law and economics, and his 1973 
book, The Economic Analysis of Law,62 was widely acclaimed.  
Other jurisdictions have had their share of heavyweight legal intellectuals. Given its status 
as the birth of the common law, Britain is one of those places. Judges such as William 
Blackstone 63  and Sir Edward Coke 64  were giants of their day, not to mention more 
contemporary figures, such as Lord Denning65 and Tom Bingham.66 And yet, judges in the 
UK remain relatively insulated from public scrutiny.67 While already a towering figure in UK 
legal circles, Bingham became famous for his articulation of the rule of law.68 But as 
prominent as Bingham was, not many citizens outside legal circles knew him. In fact, there is 
probably a significant percentage of Brits that cannot name a sitting judge, let alone a UK 
Supreme Court justice.  
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Throughout history American judges have produced serious, academic scholarship,69 some 
of which pushed the bounds of legal or interpretative theory. Thus books, law review articles 
and speeches have been commonly accepted media for judges. But what happens when the 
bounds of academic scholarship stretch into quasi-promotional events?  
Engaging in academic scholarship is fundamentally different from actively marketing 
ideas to the citizenry. And yet Scalia engaged in such marketing activities. At one point the 
Wall St. Journal characterised his many public appearances as “The Justice Scalia 
Roadshow”.70 While promoting books late in his career, such as Making Your Case71 and 
Reading Law,72 he made many appearances on television shows that Supreme Court justices 
do not usually find themselves on, such as 60 Minutes (CBS), Charlie Rose (PBS), Piers 
Morgan Tonight (CNN) and Fox News Sunday (Fox). According to the US Code of Judicial 
Conduct, these appearances apparently fall under Canon 4(A)(1): “Speaking, Writing and 
Teaching”.73 After all, Scalia was promoting his book that was about “the law, the legal 
system, and the administration of justice”.74 Scalia certainly pushed the bounds regarding 
what is acceptable/unacceptable in this domain.  
 
1. SCALIA, JUDGING AND POP CULTURE 
Although US Supreme Court decisions have been shown to generally follow public opinion,75 
the court itself, historically, has been slow to catch on with certain aspects of popular culture 
(e.g., televised hearings). This is unsurprising in some respects. Many justices shy away from 
the limelight, leaving it to those in the political branches. After all, the role of judging 
traditionally does not involve “making news” in the promotional sense. But there was one 
area in which Scalia was genuinely in tune with popular culture: in his theory of originalism.  
The theory of originalism has a deep association with American popular culture and the 
public’s understanding of state symbols such as the Founders and the Constitution. Indeed we 
are not the first ones to make this case.76 Further, originalist and textualist interpretative 
methods have deep roots Justice Hugo Black (1937-1971) was a strong proponent of these 
methods and was unafraid to advocate them to others.77 Part of the connection between 
originalism and popular culture arises from the long-held idolisation of the 1789 American 
Constitution. Even though the current reach of the Constitution would probably be 
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unrecognisable to the Founders,78 and even though specific sections of the constitution seem 
antiquated, the American public continues to engage in a form of constitutional worship that 
is difficult to find anywhere else.79  
Scalia’s use of originalism is certainly not the only example of his unique connection to 
popular culture. Scalia’s judicial and extra-judicial writings, in addition to his courtroom and 
non-courtroom antics, generally got a wide amount of media attention.80 One such example 
came during oral argument in Department of Health and Human Services v. Florida,81 when 
Scalia compared the government making everyone purchase health insurance to the 
government making everyone eat broccoli. Although this line is often thought of as a Scalia 
original, he actually borrowed it.82 Nevertheless, Scalia was keen enough to pick up this 
argument and use it during oral argument. Although his plea was ultimately unsuccessful, it 
certainly influenced the debate about the Affordable Care Act, and more pointedly, the 
Supreme Court’s 2012 judgment of the law in Sebelius.83 
But Scalia was far from the only Supreme Court justice to permeate popular culture. In 
fact, other SCOTUS justices, such as Ruth Bader Ginsberg, are also prominent pop culture 
symbols. After all, the latter has her own nickname (The Notorious RGB),84 her own fan 
blog,85 and of late has been outspoken on some inherently political issues.86 On the fan blog 
visitors can even purchase a merchandise, including baby clothes, coffee mugs, and carrier 
bags.87 But Ginsburg is  not as divisive as Scalia,88 not as formidable an interpretive theorist, 
and certainly not as humorous or biting (not on the bench, nor in her opinions).  
This pop culture relevance can be contrasted with other countries that have Supreme or 
Constitutional Courts. In some jurisdictions judges are widely viewed as out of touch with 
popular culture; and indeed, they are certainly not known or “celebrated” in the same way as 
SCOTUS justices. This is certainly the case in Britain, as the judiciary on the whole is 
relatively unknown outside of legal circles, has been criticised as being out of touch, un-
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representative, and oblivious to popular culture. This widely held perception throughout the 
UK led to the 2012 announcement that judges must undergo cultural awareness training at the 
Judicial College.89 . Last December a second-year law student penned a prominent piece for 
the Guardian newspaper about how members of the UK Supreme Court did not look like 
they had “ever put down their copy of Intellectual Property Quarterly to pick up an iPod, 
tossed aside their Neue Juristische Wochenschrift to grab a Now magazine or looked up from 
the Cambridge Law Journal to watch some Celebrity Juice”.90 Further, in 2013 a sitting 
Supreme Court justice, Baroness Hale, even proclaimed that many judges lead “sheltered 
lives”.91  
At some rudimentary level, being in tune with popular culture means that judges must 
understand and use the technology that is shaping society, and which can open up the 
judiciary to increased transparency and accountability. Perhaps surprisingly, this is where 
Scalia—and on an institutional level, the US Supreme Court more generally—have 
repeatedly chosen to be out of step with popular culture.92 Compared with other constitutional 
courts, their ideas on the use of technology both inside the courtroom and out is out of step 
with evolving standards.93 Cameras in the courtroom are one such example. For a variety of 
reasons, the US Supreme Court refuses to allow cameras to televise their proceedings. And 
yet in some countries this is common practice. For instance, the UK Supreme Court now 
video records all hearings and judgment announcements, and these can be streamed live and 
are also archived on their website.94 Additionally, the UKSC has Twitter, Youtube and Flickr 
channels as well.95 Even with all these accoutrements, the status of UKSC justices in popular 
culture remains well below their transatlantic counterparts.  
From the above, it should be obvious that Scalia had an ambivalent relationship with 
popular culture, engaging with it when it suited his interpretive style, method of justice, or 
promotional aspirations, and also shunning it when it could potentially take him out of his 
comfort zone or damage his credibility.   
 
IV. JUSTICE SCALIA AS “SACRED SYMBOL” 
Calling Scalia a “sacred symbol” captures something of his significance in law, politics, and 
popular culture. As we see it for a judge to become a sacred symbol he or she must:  
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(1) profoundly affect the course of American jurisprudence96 through either  
(a) the significance and impact of his/her judicial opinions,  
(b) his/her influence on other members of the judiciary, or  
(c) through his/her extra-judicial writing/speaking;  
and  
(2) have a large segment of the citizenry—including those outside legal and political 
circles—become attached. 
 
Some justices may fulfil one or the other of these criteria, but not both. Justice Ginsburg 
clearly satisfies the second, considering that a large segment of Americans know her, identify 
with her, and hold her in high esteem. However—while certainly no intellectual slouch—it 
would be difficult to say that she has “profoundly” affected the course of American 
jurisprudence. On the flip side judges have often profoundly affected American jurisprudence, 
but for whatever reason, have not achieved much societal attachment.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
When a judge becomes a “sacred symbol” he/she may foment internal division on a court, 
and attract wanted and unwanted attention. In Scalia’s case the intense controversy 
surrounding President Obama’s effort to replace him arose from Scalia’s status as a “sacred 
symbol”. Judges as “sacred symbols” may impose high costs on the courts on which they sit 
and in the legal systems in which they serve.  
Recently Keith Bybee splendidly articulated the complex duality of the American legal 
system: that even though citizens tend to recognise judges as independent actors who make 
impartial decisions, so to do they recognise that politics or partisanship plays a vital role in 
judicial decision-making.97 Bybee believes that these are “acceptable hypocrisies”, and that 
(American) courts depend on them to function.98 Justice Scalia’s story also displays such 
potential hypocrisies: at times it is difficult to tell whether or not Scalia was pushing the 
bounds of legal and political legitimacy, or in fact, the bounds of legal and political 
hypocrisy.99 Perhaps he was doing both.  
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